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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ANITA

FLIPPEN~

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 7551

FAY MILLWARD,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by her on the 20th day
of November, 1949, when an automobile which she was
operating was run into from the rear by a.n automobile
being driven by the defendant. The jury returned a
verdict of no cause of action. The plaintiff ap:peals upon
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one ground, to-wit: that the court erred in giving the
following instruction:
"You are instructed that no person shall
suddenly decrease S!peed of a vehicle without
first giving an appropriate signal which would
indicate to a driver immediately to the rear
that said vehicle was going to decrease its
speed; and if you find by a ·preponderance of
the evidence that plaintiff suddenly decreased
her speed upon said highway without giving a
signal that could be seen and observed by a
driver in the rear and that her failure to give
such a signal in sufficient time to warn the
defendant caused or contributed to the accident
and the resulting injuries, if any, then your
verdict shall be in favor of defendant on plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action" (R. 23).
The appellant contends that said instruction was
inapplicable because there was no evidence to support
the giving of the instruction, and was ·prejudicial.
A determination of this question requires a review
of the evidence offered and received at the trial. We shall
therefore briefly review the evidence.
Franklin Charles Nielsen, a witness called by the
plaintiff, testified that he was an engineer employed
by the State Road Commission, and that the map, plaintiff's Exhibit "A", prepared by him, fairly represented
the intersection of Highway 91 and Church Street
immediately North of the -main intersection of Layton,
Utah (R. 33). The ma1p showed High-vvay 91 to be a t\yo
lane highway North of the intersection of Highway 91
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

and Church Street, and a four lane highway South of
said intersection. That running along~ the West side
of Highway 91 and parallel to the highway was a ditch,
which ditch ran under Church Street immediately West
of the intersection of Church Street and I-Iigh,vay 91.
That on the ''Test side of Highway 91 and on the North
side of Church Street where the two intersect, -is a power
pole and that there is a second power pole approximately
140 feet South of the first power pole shown on the
bottom of the map (R. 38).
Mr. Fay Millard, the defendant was then called as
a witness by the plaintiff. He testified that on the
morning of the collision he was operating a 1942 Ford
Station Wagon with hydraulic four wheel brakes in
good condition (R. 40). That he encountered a fog as
he was operating south -along Highway 91. That he was
driving approximately eight to fifteen miles· an hour
as he drove south along the highway toward Layton and
that as he approached the intersection of Church Street
and High,vay 91 he was travelling at a speed between
eight and twelve miles an hour (R. 41). He was asked
the following questions and gave the following answers:
How close did you get to Mrs. Flippen's
car before you saw it~
'' Q.

''A. I don't know, sir.

"Q. Did you see the car at all before the
collision'
"A. That I can't say."
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He further testified that the highway was damp but in
good shape (R. 41). He testified that he did not know
whether ~is brakes were applied just before or at the
time of the collision, but that he made ari immediate
stop at the time of the collision (R. 42).
L. A. Youngberg, called to testify by the plaintiff,
testified that: That he was an officer employed by the
Salt Lake City Police Department and had made a study
of matters pertaining to traffic administration and the
laws governing the stopping of automobiles. That the
reaction time of an average person driving an automobile keeping a constant lookout is three-quarters of a
second. That one operating an automobile with four
wheel brakes in good condition on an oiled high,vay
traveiling at the rate of eight miles an hour shoul~ be
able to bring the car to a complete stop at between 10.88
and 13.08 feet (R. 46). That travelling at twelve miles
an hour a car should be stopped at between 17.92 and
22.83 feet (R. 47).
•
The plaintiff, Anita Flippen, then testified: That
she resides at Clearfield, Utah, is thirty seven years of
age and has operated an automobile between sixteen
and twenty years. That on the morning of November
20th, she left her home which is approximately four
miles North of Layton, sometime before eight o'clock.
That she drove a Hudson Pickup truck which her husband had had three or four years. That when she left
her home the atmosphere was clear and bright (R. 52).
That as she reached approximately the Naval Base Road
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within a mile South of her hon1e, she ran into a fog
and immediately turned on the bright lights of the automobile. That prior to encountering the fog she had been
operating the auto1nobile at twenty miles an hour and
then cut the speed to about ten miles an hour. That the
fog \Yas hea,~~ and that \Yith lights on she could see
dow·n the hig-h,vay approxin1ately forty to fifty feet
(R. 53). That there is a church to the right of High,vay
91 on Church Street known as Rose of Saint Lima and
that she was on her \Yay to attend eight o'clock mass
(R. 54). That as she approached the intersection of
Church Street and Highway 91 she w.as travelling between eight and ten miles ·an h·our and had slowed up
for the corner which she kne\v she vvas approaching
(R. 54). That she had traversed that road leaving High\Yay 91 and going over on Church Street ·practically
eYery Sunday and a fevv days in between for a nu1nber
of years (R. 55). That the collision occurred south of
the po,ver pole at the Northwest corner of the intersection of Highway 91 and Church Street (R. 53). That the
point of collision was indicated by her on the map, Exhibit "A" at a !point marked "f". That at the time of the
collision her automobile was facing in a Southwesterly
direction and that she had just started to make the
turn and had turned the wheel partially (R. 56). The
following questions were asked and the following
answers given :

"Q. State whether or not prior to that time
you had given any signal of turning.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''A. I looked in my reflecting mirror and
I had partially lowered the left front window
and raised my h·and as a signal.
Was your hand still raised as a signal
at the time of the impact~
'' Q.

''A. I had just drawn it back in to .put
back on the steering wheel.''
She testified that immediately on the impact she was
thrown back into the window and then over the steering
wheel into the windshield. That she was temporarily
dazed or stunned and when she ''came to'' she felt the
motion of the car and on looking out of the car could
see an outline of buildings across the street. That she
applied her brakes and steered over to the side of the
road to get off of the road (R. 56, 57). That she brought
the car to a stop and immediately turned off the ignition and the lights (R. 56). That when the car was
brought to a stop it was at approximately the south
power pole shown on the map at 140 feet South of the
North :power pole where the collision occurred (R. 57).
That she was travelling approximately eight miles an
· hour at the time of impact. That at the time of impact
she had on the bright lights of the automobile. That the
impact broke the tail light of the automobile (R. 57).
That the tail light was in good condition before the
impact (R. 57). That the impact injured her left shoulder
and she had to open the door with her right hand and
was in the act of getting out of the car when another
car drove up from the side (R. 57). That it was someone else, not the defendant. That she got ·out of the car
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and \Yas offered assistance by a young man 'vho1n she
believes 'vas ~Ir. Buckley \Yhom she had never met before
(R. 58). That she then walked toward the end of the
truck and at that ti1ne the defendant \Yas approaching
and she \Yaited for him to con1e up and had a brief
conYersa.tion \Yith hi1n in which she said: ''My gosh, guy,
what happened~''; he said: '' I didn't see you until I
was upon you". That there was nothing else said that
she remembered. That she was then- assisted to the
rectory. That she suffered a broken shoulder blade in
the left shoulder, broken ribs and numerous and serious
bruises ( R. 59). That as a result of the shock she suffered severe pain and was required to take sedatives .
to quiet her nerves and at the time of the trial was still
using sedatives. That she was suffering from a nervous
disorder \Yhich was a result of the death of her child
in an accident some three of f·our years before (R .. 61).
That immediately prior to the collision she could see
to the right of the automobile toward the ditch and
culvert she was about to cross and could distinguish
the ditch (R. 63). That the automobile had a rear vision
side mirror and \Vhen she looked into the mirror she saw'
no car approaching. That she looked into the mirror
a point four or five lengths of the car north of the point
of impact (R. 65) and after she had looked she gave
the signal. That she was aware of the fact that she was
approaching the intersection some distance back of
the intersection (R. 65, 66). That she could see forty
to fifty feet ahead on the highway. That she was driving to the right of the center or yellow line and she could
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see the yellow line (R. 66). That the left wheel \Vas
approximately five or six feet west of the center line.
That she had turned to the right as she approached
the corner in order to get off the road to make the turn
(R. 67). That she had slightly turned the wheel and the
front of her car had turned slightly so that the car was
actually on an angle at the time of the impact (R. 67).
That she stopped her car by the south power pole. That
she guided it off the highway at the pole and at the
time applied her brakes immediately before stopping
(R. '68). That the car was completely off the highway
when stopped (R. 69). That · vvithout lights one
could see in the fog twenty five to thirty feet (R. 70, 71).
That at no time did she see a car in £ron t of her but
some cars ·passed her in the opposite direction (R. 71).
That the road was dry. That there was moisture on
the window shield and she had had her window shield
wipers working (R. 7?). That she turned off her light~
and ignition as soon as she stopped the car (R. 73).
That at the time of the impact she V\ras going about eight
miles .an hour and the motor was still running and the
car was in second gear (R. 74). That she had put the
ear in second gear when she slowed up just as she ·was
going to turn. That at the time she gave the signal
she put in the clutch so that she could shift gears -and
that she did shift her gears but did not put on her
brake (R. 74). That she put her ·car in second gear so
that she would not miss the road over the ditch. That she
could see the ditch and the road over the ditch twenty
five to thirty feet ·off to the west. That she could see
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the road very plainly. That if she had turned sharp
enough she could have missed the bridge and hit the
ditch (R. 75). That there 'vas no reason to think that
she 'Yas going to hit the ditch but that she took the
precaution to shift the gear but did not put on her
brake (R. 76). That the doctor did not put her arm in a
cast but did put it in a sling which she used for between
t\vo and three months. That she was in bed a ,,~eek or ten
days (R. 77).
LeRoy Rex Flippen was then called by the !plaintiff.
He testified that he 'vas the husband of the plaintiff,
resided at Clearfield, Utah, and owned his own electrical
business ( R. 78). That in his business he used the 1946
Hudson Pickup truck involved in the collision. That
the tail light of the automobile was w·orking the night
before the collision. That in the collision the light -vvas
badly damaged and was broken. That he repaired the
taillight and re·placed the lamp after the collision. That
prior to the collision the glass in the left door wa.s in
good condition but that it had been badly broken in the
collision (R. 79, 80). That the tail light was built into
a heavy steel construction (R. 81). That it was embedded
in the steel member. That the light and glass were broken
in the impact. That the steel frame in which the light
was imbedded was bent in the collision (R. 82). That when
he arrived at the scene of the collision his automobile
was near the power pole in the south end of the map.
That when he arrived at the scene ·of the -collision he
looked up the road from his automobile and saw the
defendant's automobile with his spare tire embedded
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In the radiator grill of the defendant's car (R. 84).
That he did not see the tail light of his automobile in
operation the morning of the collision (R. 84). That
the last time he had seen it was the night before about
nine o'clock. That he had looked at it at that time when
he purchased gas. That there was a globe in the taillight
after the accident but it would not burn. That the reflecto·r glass was broken, lost out and scattered over
the road. That after the accident he !put a piece of red
plastic in the tail light (R. 85). That the truck was
approximately five feet wide. That it appeared that
the center of the im~pact took place seventeen inches
from the left side of the truck and thirty four inches
. from the right side (R. 86).
It was then stipulated by counsel for both parties
that two statements of Dr. Joseph B. Tanner might be
read to the jury, and that if he were present he might
testify according to the statements. That such statements were substantially the s.ame. The second one,
\Yritten on May 17th, 1950, stated that he had attended
the plaintiff following an automobile a_ccident on November 20th, 1949. That her injuries consisted of moderate
shock and multiple bruises, especially up the entire
left body from the foot to the head, a sprained left
shoulder and fracture ·of the left shoulder blade without
dis;placement. That at the time she had a temporary
paralysis of the muscles of the left shoulder. That the
bruises. healed rapidly so that in four weeks time her
main complaint was nervous reaction and pain in the
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left shoulder area. That the fracture healed without
marked complications. That at the time of the statement she 'Yas completely recovered physically although
she still complained of aches and pains in the left
shoulder follo,Ying' strenuous "'"ork and activity an<l
that she had recently had s'velling of the left shoulder
follo,ving heaYier use of the arm. That there was no
limitation of motion or evidence of weakness :present.
That she had an unusual degree of nervous shock which
may be partially explained by the fact that she lost
a son in an automobile acciderit about three years before
and had never recovered her composure since. That hi~
prognosis was that he expected no serious complications
or after effects to develop·, but she evidently had a
minor residual traumatic neurosis and· fibrositis which
may gradually disappear or which may remain and
even become more severe and disabling (R. 89, 90).
Thereupon the plaintiff rested.
Mr. Ross Everett vVilliams was then called by the
defendant and testified. He testified that he was a
resident of Kaysville, Utah, and operator of a cafe.
That he knew the defendant but had not known him
prior to the day of the collision. That with his son in
lavv he vvas on the way from Sahara Village to Salt Lake
City. That they had followed Mr. Millward's car some
distance before the collision, travelling between fifteen
and seventeen miles an hour. That when they followed
the defendant at a distance greater than twenty five
to thirty feet he could not see the defendant's taillight,
and that he saw no red light in front of the defendant'R
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car (R. 91). That one could see a tail light in the fog
between twenty five and thirty feet but could not see
that far without a light (R. 92). That at the time of the
collision they were travelling behind the defendant and
heard the collision, and that they thereup·on stopped
their automobile. That they drove around in front
of the defendant and in front of the plaintiff (R. 92).
That the collision occurred about where the plaintiff
had placed the point of collision and that her car was
setting about in the middle of the intersection and that
they had to push the truck off the road. That it was
parked over against the curb (R. 93). That after the
collision the plaintiff's truck was squarely in front
of the defendant's car down the highway about ten
or twelve feet (R. 94). That Mr. Buckley heLped the
plaintiff to the church and he helped the defendant
to the Signal Cafe and called the law and a doctor
(R. 94). That a man from Ols.en's garage helped him
and Mr. Buckley push the cars off the highway. On
cross examination he testified that Mrs. Flippen's car
. was stopped right in the middle of the road that turns
over to the church and that when ~he car was pushed
off the highway it was left immediately south of the
stop sign on the south side of Church Street at the intersection (R. 96). Williams was handed a statement to
read which he had previously made wherein he had
stated:
"when her car. was hit it was knocked past
the road that turns off to the little Catholic
church'';
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He stated that he had not meant that (R. 96). That at
the time he made the statement he thought it was right
but that it "\Vas a long tin1e to remember. That he was
sure that it '""as not clear past the road.
Floyd Dean Buckley was then ealled by the defendand and testified. He said that he was a resident of
Sahara Village and was a son in law of Mr. Williams.
That he had not met the defendant prior to the accident.
That on the morning of November 20th he was on his
way to Salt Lake City and had followed the defendant
from Sahara Village (R. 98). That the fog was pretty
heavy and thick. That he followed the defendant's car
at ~a distance of ap:proximately twenty five feet at a
speed of bet,veen fifteen -and eighteen miles an hour
(R. 99). That at the intersection of the road that turns
off to the Catholic church, he heard the collision and
pulled around the defendant's car. That after the collision the plaintiff's car w:as twelve to fourteen fe.et
in front of the defendant's. That the defendant's car
was directly behind the plaintiff's car (R. 101). That
he had nothing to do with moving the cars after the
accident (R. 102). That after he returned from the
church the plaintiff's ear was on the shoulder of the
highway just past the turn going to the church (R. 102).
That one could see in the fog without any lights,
possible thirty feet (R. 102, 103). That when he followed
the defendant's car down to the highway prior to the
accident he could see the tail light but did not see any
taillight in front of the defendant's car (R. 103).
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George E. Briggs was called by the defendant and
testified. He stated that he was the Town M·arshal of
Layton, Utah. That about eight o'clock or· 8:10 he
received a call and went to the scene of the accident. That
it was very foggy. That one could see twenty five to
thirty feet ahead (R. 104). That he issued no cit·ation
(R. 105). That when he arrived the defendant's automobile was on the east side of the road (R. 106). That
the 1Jlaintiff's automobile was :at the power pole sixty
or seventy feet south of the intersection (R. 107). That
the automobile was fifty or seventy five feet south of the
south boundary of Church Street (R. 108).
The defendant then testified as follows: That on the
morning of the accident he was operating his father's
automobile, going to Salt Lake City from Sahara Village
(R. 109). That after he got to Highway 91 he had on
his dim lights (R. 110). That as he approached Layton
he was driving approximately fifteen miles an hour
and then slowed down to between eight and ten miles
an hour ( R. 111). That thereafter he ran in to the Flippen automobile at the intersection of Church Street
(R. 111). The following questions were then asked and
the following questions given :
'' Q. Did you see any tail light as you came
upon the highway~
"A. N o, sir.
.

"Q.
"A.

On any car at
N o, sir.
.

all~
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'' Q. Did you see any car 1n front of
"A. N o, s1r.
.

you~

"Q. You don't know just 'vhen you did
first observe the Flippen ear'?
'' . ._:\..

No, sir, I don't''

That after the impact he walked over to the Flippen
vehicle which was twelve or fifteen feet straight ~ahead
of his car on the highway. That just before the impact
he was looking straight ahead. That there was no one
in the car with him and his window shield was clear
(R. 112). That he had a conversation with the plaintiff.
The following question was asked and the following
answer g1ven :

'' Q. ''That was · that

conversation·~

''A. I remember asking her why there was
no light, why no tail light at that time; and
if I remember right, she said something about
the-_not being able to see with her lights on.''
That he had tried to drive with his bright lights on
that bright lights hindered him bee.ause they had a
tendency to throw a glare back and seemed to shorten
the line of vision. That he could see fifteen to twenty
five feet ahead ""'ith dim lights on. He was asked if he
had any further conversation with Mrs. Flippen to
which he answered that he did not believe .so. He further
testified that when the two cars met it was a solid
blow, and that in the collision his knees hit the dash
board and broke the control off. That after his conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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versation with the plaintiff he and Mr. Williams walked
to the Signal Cafe ·and called Mr. Briggs 1and Dr.
Tanner (R. 113). That he could see cars approaching
with lights on fifty to sixty feet. He did not kno·w
whether they were dim lights or not. There was one
car behind him as he proceeded down the highway. That
that ear pulled up behind him at the stop sign as he was
about to enter Highway 91 and he could see lights
from then on to the point of impact and that if he looked
in his rear mirror he could see lights. That Exhibit 1
is a fair picture of his automobile after the accident
( R. 114). It was stipulated that the reasonable cost
to repair the defendant's automobile was $250.00. The
defendant further testified that he had a conversation
with Mr. Flippen about two weeks after the accident
at which Mr. Flippen stated that possibly the tail light
did not work. That he did not move his car or the
Flipp·en's car ·after the accident (R. 115). On cross
examination the defendant stated that at the time his
deposition was taken he testified that no damage was
done at all to the tail light of the !plaintiff's automobi~e.

Thereupon the defense rested.
Mrs. Flippen was then recalled to the stand and

stated that after the collision of the two automobiles
she did not have a conversation with the defendant in
which she said that she did not have the tail light on
or that the head lights would hinder driving (R. 118).
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LeRoy Flippen was then recalled -and testified that
he had a conversation with Mr. Millward some time
after the accident in " . hich they discussed the stop
light and not the tail light of his automobile. That
he had had a little trouble 'vith the switch on the brake
light which turns the light on for a stop signal when
the brake is applied, but that that is different than the
tail lig~t and has nothing to do with the tail light. He
further testified that he observed that the tail light
wras "~orking on Saturday night about nine o'clock and
that nothing occurred between that time and eight o'clock
the next morning \vhich would lead him to believe that the
tail light \Yas not working (R. 119). On cross examination he stated that he had a conversation with Mr.
l\fillward after the accident some days later regarding
the taillight (R. 120). Thereup.on both sides rested.
Before th~ Court instructed the· jury, one of the
jurors, Mr. Hendricks, visited the Judge and told him
that he was disturbed about the evidence given by the
plaintiff that she had given the signal without lowering the window of her automobile all the way, stating that he could not give such a signal without lowering the window of his automobile all the way.
The Court then in chambers discuss·ed with counsel
the proposed instructions to the jury, one of which
"\vas Instruction No. 7 to the effect that no verson shall
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stop or suddenly decrease speed of a vehicle without
giving an appropriate signal. The Court agreed that
there was no evidence to support the instruction. Counsel
the
the
the
the

for the defendant stated that he had been told by
defendant certain matters which would support
instruction and asked leave to reopen and put
witness back on the stand. The Court then reopened
case and the defendant was again 'placed on the

stand. He testified that he had discuss·ed certain matters
with the plaintiff concerning the tail light and when
asked if he had had any further conversation he said
''No''.- He was asked if he had had any further conversation with her about her position on the highway to which
he answered "No". Mr. Richards then stated to the
Court that he was mistaken and withdrew the witness
from the stand (R. 122).
Mr. Fl1ppen was then recalled by the plaintiff. He
testified that one could give a signal while operating
his automobile without putting the gla-ss in the windo'v
of the door all the way down (R. 123, 124).
Before the Court instructed the jury counsel again
called the attention of the Court to the fact that there
was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff

s~opped

or suddenly decreased the speed of her automobile
before the collision. The Court then struck from Instruction No. 7 the words "stop or" but gave the instruction
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heretofore set forth concerning suddenly decreasing
the speed of her car.
The plaintiff duly excepted to the giving of Instruction No. 7 on the ground that there was no evidence
in the case of any sudden decrease of S'peed ( R. 125, 126).
The Court instructed_ the jury that driving into a
vehicle on· the high,vay before you see it is negligence
as a matter of la'v and that in this case the defendant was guilty of negligence which would preclude his
recovering on his counter claim and would entitle the
plaintiff to recover her damages against him unless
the plaintiff "\Yas guilty of negligence herself, which
was a proximate cause of her injuries (R. 20, 21). The
Court further instructed that vlaintiff might be found
to have been contributorily negligent on one of two
grounds: That plaintiff suddenly decreased her speed
'vithout giving a warning or that she failed to have
lighted the tail light of her automobile (Instructions
7 and 8, R. 23) .
The jury returned a verdict, no cause of action.
The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial which
'vas argued to the Court. The Court admitted that there
was no evidence to support the giving of Instruction
No. 7 but stated that he felt that the instruction was
not prejudicial. However, the Court stated that the
verdict of the jury was not in accordance with his feelings in the matter and had he been trying the case without a jury would have given a judgment, for the plaintiff.
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The plaintiff and appellant relies upon the following points for reversal of the verdict and judgment
appealed from.
POINT ONE

The Court erred in giving instruction No. 7 which
as given reads:
''You are instructed that no person shall
suddenly decrease speed of a vehicle without
first giving an ar>·propriate signal which would
indicate to a driver immediately to ·the rear
that such vehicle was going to decrease its
speed; and if you find a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff suddenly decreased
her speed upon said highway without giving a
signal that could be seen and observed by a
driver in the rear and that her failure to give
such signal in sufficient time to warn defendant caused or contributed to the ·accident and
the resulting injuries, if any, then your verdict shall be in favor of defendant on plaintiff's
com:plaint, no cause of action",
for the reason that there is no evidence that the [)laintiff suddenly decreased the speed of her automobile
and that said instruction was prejudicial to the plaintiff.
POINT TWO

That the Court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's motion for 'a new trail for the reason set forth
in Point One.
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,.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION No. 7 AND
THAT THE GIVING OF SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS
PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF.

The eYidence as revievved establishes that there
was no evidence of any sudden slowing down of the
plaintiff's automobile. The trial judge on the motion
for a ne\\- trial admitted that fact.
The giving of an inapplicable instruction is error.
\-Vhen is it prejudicial error~ It is conceded that it
is not error to give an erroneous instruction if an
examination of all the evidence establishes that the
one complaining of the error would not be entitled
to prevail in any event, Jacobs v. Jacobs, 299 N.Y.S.
187. The general rule concerning the giving of an
inapplicable instruction is stated in 52 Am. Jur., page
453, Sec. 579, as follows:
''An instruction not based on the evidence
is erroneous in that it introduces before the
jury facts not presented thereby and is well
calculated to induce them to suppose that such
state of facts in the opinion of the court is
possible under the evidence and may be considered by them. ''
The court in Jessup v. Davis, 155 Neb. 1, 211
N.\V. 190, stated the rule to be that instructions to a
'
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jury that are ina-pplicable to the proved facts and
which are calculated to and probably do mislead the
jury will ordinarily constitute reversible error.
In ruling on instructions given and refused in the
case of Hunter v. Michaelis, 198 Pac. (2d) 245, the
Court said:
"We conclude that the giving of the discussed instructions and the failure to give defendant's request No. 6 would in all likelihood
mislead the jury and hence constitutes prejudicial error. ''
The decisions of this Court have been n~arly
uniform in holding that the giving of an instruction
upon an alleged act of negligence upon which there
is no. evidence would be presumed to be prejudicial
error. In two separate cases Justice Elias Hansen
ruled on this matter. In Kendall v. Fordham, 9 Pac.
(2d) 183, h_e stated:
''The law is well settled in this jurisdiction,
as well as elsewhere, that it is reversible error
for a court to submit a charged act of negligence to a jury for its consideration and determination in the absence of evidence tending
to show the existence of the negligence complained of. Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Company, 46 Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53.
There is no evidence in this case which tends
to show what started the fire in the defendant's
·automobile and therefore the court was in error
in ~permitting the jury to speculate as to its
origin.''
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In a subsequent case, W ood~vard v. . Spring Canyon
Coal Co1npany, 63 Pac. (2d) 267, 90 Utah 578, he stated:
''It is a settled la'v in this jurisdiction that
negligence must be both charged and proved.
A failure of either is fatal. Here there was a
failure of both. It is equally well established
that it is prejudicial error to permit the jury
to find ·a verdict bas-ed upon either negligence
not charged or negligence charged but not
shown. Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 189
P. 74; Verde v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah
502, 196 P. 225, 15 A.L.R. '641; Smith v. San
Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 35 Utah 390, 100 P.
673; Machy v. Bingham New Haven Copper &
Gold ~fining Co., 54 Utah 171, 180 P. 416; Martindale v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 48 Utah
464, 160 P. 275; Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah
256, 9 Pac. (2d) 183; Industrial Commission v.
Wasatch Grading Co., 80 Utah 223, 14 Pac. (2d)
988. ''
The appellant is aware that there has been a
change in the policy of the court as to the prejudicial
effect of an instruction not supported by the evidence.
As Justice Wolfe in a dissenting op1n1on in Clawson
v. Walgreen Drug Company, 162 Pac. (2d) 759, 108
Utah 577, stated:
''I note a change in policy in this ·court in
regard to determining whether inapplicable instructions are prejudicial. In earlier days this
court held that an inapplicable instruction would
be presumed to be prejudicial unless it clearly
a·ppeared that it could not have been so. (Citing
four cases). Of late and in this case we have
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held that an instruction inapplicable to any
evidence will be presumed to have been ignored
by the jury. This means that we will assume
that the lay jury exercises more discrimination
than the judge. Certainly I am not one to hold
that the mere giving of abstract instructions
not applicable to any evidence necessarily constitutes iprejudicial error. Trial judges under
the pressure put upon them by jury trials give
instructions at the time thought to be applicable, which we, in a careful survey of the whole
case may find inapplicable. Unless there is
good reason for supposing that the jury might
have been misled by such instructions, there
should not be held to be ·prejudicial error even
'though Sec. 104-24-4 (4) U.C.A. 1943 states
that: 'the court shall instruct the jury in writing upon the law applicable to the case' ".
A consideration of the evidence in that case, Clawson v. Walgreen Drug -company, and the op:posite conclusions reached, furnishes a basis for determining
when an inapplicable instruction is erroneous. In that
case the plaintiff was injured when he walke'd into
iron trap doors which covered an opening in the side
walk immediately adjoining the defendant's building
at the corner -of 25th Street and Washington Avenue
in Ogden. The doors were immediately south of the
south front of the store and open so that when each
half was up the doors ran north and south. The
evidence was conclusive, without any dispute, that the
plaintiff walked into the east of the two doors fror11
the east and that he could not possibly have walked
into the hole created in the side walk by opening the
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doors by walking into the hole from the south. However, the Court gave an instruction that if the jury
found that by reason of the absence of any fence or
barrier or other protection on the south side of the
trap door the side \valk was not reasonably safe it
could find the defendant guilty of negligence. The
defendant contended that the giving of that instruction "~as prejudicial error. The majority of the Court,
s:peaking through Justice \v...ade, held that since there
was no dispute in the evidence as to the manner in
which the accident occurred the giving of the instruction could not be prejudicial error. The Court stated:
''One other instruction should be noted : In
defining the defendant's duty the jury -vvas told
that the defendant was required to make the
opening in the side walk reasonably safe for
customary traffic on the public street and that
if the jury found that by reason of the absence
of any fence or barrier or other protection on
the south side of the trap doors the side walk
was not reasonably safe it could find the defendant guilty of negligence. As already noted
there has been no evidence that the failure to
have a fence or barrier on the south side of
the door in any way contributed to the injury.
The plaintiff, according to his own testimony,
did_ not fall into the hole. He bumped into one
door and apparently knocked it closed and fell
upon the edge of the other door. Witness
Southam also so testified. The failure to have
a barrier on the south side could have made no
difference. The court therefore erred in giving
such instruction, but in view of the conclusiveness of the evidence that the plaintiff fell over
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the door and did not step into the hole to the
south between the doors, the jury could not
have been misled by this instruction wnd therefore the error was not p,rejudicial. ''

The reasoning of the court that the jury could
not be misled because of the conclusiveness of the
evidence as to the cause of the accident, is the important part of that ruling.
In the case at bar, the opposite situation· presents
itself. Bearing in mind that the court instructed the
jury that the conduct of the defendant was negligent
as a matter of law, the only question remaining was
whether or not the -plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The question of contributory negligence was submitted to the jury on two grounds: One, by Instruction No. 8 regarding the plaintiff driving without a
tail light and the other by the instruction under attack regarding_ suddenly slowing down. If in the case
at bar the evidence was uncontradicted that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent because she was operating her automobile without a tail light, the court
might well rule as the majority did in Cla~vson v. W algreen _Drug Company, that the error was harmless and
the jury could not have been misled, but such· was
not the case. There was a distinct conflict of the evidence as to that matter. The plaintiff testified that
she turned the lights of her automobile on as soon
as she ran into the fog (R. 53), and that after she
brought her car to a stop off the highway after the
collision she turned off the lights and turned off the
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ignition (R. 56). She further testified that the tail
light of her automobile was broken in the collision
(R. 57). The :plaintiff's husband testified that the
tail light of the automobile was in good condition at
nine o'clock on the night before the collision and that
nothing hap·p.ened in the time intervening between
then and the time of the collision which might lead
him to think that the tail light \Yas not in operating
condition (R. 119). The defendant testified that the
plaintiff stated that she had turned off her lights
because the lights interferred with her driving in the
fog ( R. 113), but this the plain tiff denied ( R. 118) .
The defendant testified that he had a conversation
''Tith the husband of the plaintiff subsequent to the
accident concerning the condition of the tail light (R.
115), and the plaintiff's husband testified concerning
the conversation disputing the statement of the defendant (R. 119). Thus it appears that the evidence
concerning the matter of the plaintiff operating her
automobile without a tail light was in serious dispute.
Under such state of the evidence it may fairly be
said that the instruction directing the attention of
the jury to the matter of sudden stopping in all likelihood confused and misled the jury. In connection with
such a situation, I cite again from the dissenting opinion of Justice Wolfe in Clawson v .. Walgreen Drug

Company, above:
"The instruction- that if the jury found by
reason of the absence of any fence or barrier
or other protection on the south side of the
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trap door the side walk was not reasonably
safe, it could find the defendant guilty of negligence, was prejudicial error. Absence of a fence
or barrier on the south side of the door did
not contribute to the injury. Hitherto in this
opinion for purposes more apparent now, I
took occasion to call attention to the fact that
we have become more liberal than formerly in
determining whether nona pplicable instructions
were prejudicial, a policy with which I am in
accord. Our inquiry should be as to_ whether
there was a good reason to think that a nonapplicable instruction was likely to mislead or
confuse jurymen-reasonable and conscientious
jurymen-as to draw into the vortex of their
deliberations the assumpt"ion that the subject
matter of the instruction was materially involved in the case. And vve cannot ascribe to
the jurymen in this inquiry the experience of
astute lawyers or jurists. If the ordinary mind
might be likely to conclude that something was
a material element in the ease because of an
instruction whereas it was not and because of
that conclusion there 'vas a good likelihood that
the verdict was substantially influenced or affected thereby to the detriment of the appella.n t, such erroneous instruction should be held
as ~prejudicial * * .;!;
''The mind of the jury would be pointedly
directed to the fact that the judge considered
there was evidence from which it could he
concluded that the plaintiff had fallen into the
vault because of lack of protection from the
south side. The instruction was actually calculated to do that. Yet the accident definitely
was caused by the plaintiff not falling into the
hole but actually walking against the raised
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barrier, falling over it-an act in itself strongly
indicative of lack of care for his own protection. To divert the mind of the jury from a
chain of circumstances which culminated in the
accident to a false chain on which could be
predicated a conclusion of different and perhaps
greater culpability on the part of the defendant
'vhen both true and ~false chains themselves
"\vere so closely connected that the same physical
object and the manner in which the accident
happened may, with great likelihood, have influenced the jury to base a conclusion on the supposed more culpable delict.''
One cannot assume that the jury disregarded the
instruction concerning the giving of a signal and
sudden slowing, particularly in view of the fact that
the juryman Hendricks expressed to the court his
concern about the ability of the ~palintiff to give a
signal by raising her arm -out of the window without
lowering the window all the vvay (R. 121), and to
meet this problem the plaintiff introduced additional
evidence (R. 123, 124).
The inapplicable instruction was further confusing in that the court instructed that the plaintiff would
be guilty of contributory negligence if she suddenly
decreased the speed of her automobile without first
giving an appropriate signal which would indicate to
a driver immediately to the rear that she going to
decrease her speed. The defendant admitted that he
ran into the plaintiff's automobile without even seeing
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the automobile. What kind of a signal could the
·plaintiff give which would be seen by the defendant~
The Sup·reme Court of Oklahoma had before it in
a very recent case, Kelly v. Employers Casualty Co . .

et. al., 214 Pac. (2d) at 925, a case very similar to
the case at bar. In that case the plaintiff in driving
to Oklahoma City from her home approached a bridge
across the river west of the city. She saw another
car approaching the bridge from the east end and
knowing that the two cars would meet on the bridge
she decreased the speed of her car from approximately
thirty-five miles an hour to twenty-five miles an hour
and ~fter meeting and passing the approaching car on
the bridge she was rendered unconscious. The defendant pleaded that the collision of his automobile and
plaintiff's automobile was an unavoidable accident because of the slowing down of the plaintiff's car immediately before the collision and that the plaintiff
vYas contributorily negligent because she failed to
give a proper warning to those following her of her
intention to decrease the speed of her car.

Upon

the trial, the defendant offered no evidence. The
plaintiff, having been rendered unconscious could testify
to no more facts than those heretofore stated except
that her car was struck from the rear by something.
The court instructed the jury that they might find in.
favor of the defendant if they found the accident to
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be unavoidable or if the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of
the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and assigned as
error among other errors the giving of instructions
upon contributory negligence when there was no
dence to support the giving of such instructions.

evi~

The Court in rendering its decision stated:
''That 'plaintiff sustained injuries and that
she - has expended large sums of money for
medical and hospital services and that she has
not yet recovered from the effects of her injuries, are not disputed facts in this case.
\\Tith the evidence of these results following
the demolishing of her car. in the collision, we
are constrained to hold that the instruction of
the court here, complained of and which we
believe to be erroneous, misled the jury to the
prejudice of the plaintiff's rights and that she
should be granted a new trial of the action.''
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The plaintiff, upon her motion for a new trial,
argued only that the giving of Instruction No. 7 was
in error. This the court admitted and admitted that the
decision was contrary to what he would have ruled had
he been sitting without a jury, but that the instruction
\ras not prejudicial.
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In view of the matters heretofore discussed the
court erred In not granting plaintiff's motion for a
new trial.
For reasons hereinbefore pointed out, it is submitted that the ·judgment appealed from should be
reversed and the appellant awarded her costs.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT IVERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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